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In this paper, we develop a model that explains the exporters’ behaviour in international 
commodity markets considering explicitly the case of an imperfectly competitive structure of these 
markets. More specifically, drawing from the imperfect competition and trade literature, we derive 
price transmission equations between producer and consumer prices and between producer and 
export prices that can be included in large commodity models in order to verify how results of these 
models change assuming the imperfect competition hypothesis. The results obtained carrying out a 
simple simulation exercise, with two competing exporting countries and one importing region, show 
the relevance of assuming imperfect competition in commodity markets. 
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The recent high volatility in international cereal prices, with the extraordinary peak reached 
in 2008, the rapid fall in 2009 and the recent surge started in August 2010, has brought under 
scrutiny the predictive capacity of the  models currently used  by  governments and  international 
organizations to make projections on agricultural and food commodity markets as well as to analyse 
policy reform scenarios
1. The difficulty of models in predicting such a volatility in prices is clearly 
a good reason for revising their structure and characteristics, which are often too simplified for 
representing the complexities of agricultural commodity markets and for answering the increasingly 
sophisticated questions posed by researchers and policy makers.  
  In order to discuss the structure of these forecasting models, the starting point must be the 
set of assumptions underlining each of them. One of the key assumption of all these models is that 
both domestic and international agricultural commodity markets are perfectly competitive, despite a 
number of evidences that make this assumption clearly unrealistic. For example, focusing on the 
cereal  markets,  imperfect  competition  is  likely  to  come  from  the  presence  of  State  Trading 
Enterprises  (STEs)  that  manage  the  total  amount  of  some  countries’  exports  (i.e.  Canada  and 
Australia). Moreover, some large multinational companies hold relevant shares of the total world 
cereal trade, such that importers around the world can choose among a limited set of sources, either 
STEs or multinational trading firms. In principle, high market concentration by private firms does 
not automatically entails non-competitive behaviour, since such concentration may be motivated by 
other reasons than gaining market power, like, for example, strong economies of scale. STEs may 
exert  market  power  either  through  the  payment  mechanisms  to  farmers  or  through  storage 
management, even if their ability to hold stocks is limited by storage capacity (Sexton et al, 2001). 
In  addition  to  that,  national  legislations  normally  impose  some  relevant  constraints  to  STEs 
activities (i.e. they cannot impose production quotas), such that their market power may turn out to 
be rather limited.  
  In any case, the role of STEs has become one of the key issue in the on-going multilateral 
trade negotiation managed by the World Trade Organization (WTO), since some member countries 
ask for stronger regulation of their activities. For this reason, a relevant flow of scientific literature 
                                                 
1  Examples  of  such  models  are  the  AGLINK  model  managed  by  the  Organization  of  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development (OECD, 1998), the FAPRI model managed by the FAPRI consortium (Devadoss et al, 1993), and the 
WEMAC model, developed by the INRA team based in Rennes (INRA, 2010). 2 
 
has  been  produced  to  analyse  the  problems  entailed  by  the  presence  of  STEs  in  agricultural 
commodity  markets  and,  in  general,  the  role  of  imperfect  competition  in  these  markets. 
McCorriston and MacLaren (2007a), using a simulation model, show the distorting impact of STEs 
on commodity markets, both when they operate in developed countries and in developing countries. 
The same authors show, in two related papers, the distorting impact of the Australian Wheat Board 
on  international  cereal  trade,  calculating  the  welfare  loss  of  its  presence  (McCorriston  and 
MacLaren,  2007b),  as  well  as  the  distorting  role  of  state  trading  in  China  for  a  number  of 
agricultural commodities (McCorriston and MacLaren, 2010). Scoppola (2007a and 2007b) and 
Mirza (2006) study the relationship between international trade and market structure, while Sexton 
et  al.  (2007)  show  how  imperfectly  competitive  behaviour  may  affect  welfare  distribution  and 
economic development of developing countries as a result of trade liberalization. Thus, this set of 
results clearly shows that, if one wants to simulate the behaviour of economic agents operating in 
cereal markets, the imperfectly competitive structure of these markets should be taken into account.                
  Thus, it is interesting to analyse how the results of a simulation model would change if the 
imperfectly  competitive  structure  of  the  cereal  markets  is  properly  considered.  Therefore,  the 
objective  of  this  paper  is  to  develop  alternative  behavioural  equations  that  take  explicitly  into 
account  the  imperfectly  competitive  structure  of  agricultural  commodity  markets,  such  as  the 
international cereal market. In perspective, these equations, that take the form of price transmission 
equations, could be included in larger models used for policy simulations. 
  The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, the relevant methodological literature 
is reviewed, while in the following section the theoretical model underlining the new behavioural 
equations is presented. In section 4, a parameterised version of the model is derived, which can be 
used for empirical purposes, while in section 5 some simulation results are presented using a stand-
alone  version  of  the  model  calibrated  on  artificial  data.  Finally,  some  general  conclusions  are 
drawn. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Imperfect  competition  has  been  largely  covered  in  the  international  trade  literature  for 
agricultural  products.  Given  the  complexity  of  the  problem,  empirical  applications  are  usually 
limited to a restrict number of products/regions, while theoretical models can be more general.  
The  key  assumptions  of  these  models  relate  to  the  homogeneous/differentiated  goods 
hypothesis  and  the  type  of  price/quantity  competition  (Bertrand,  Cournot,  …).  The  degree  of 
differentiation certainly depends on the type of product, even if the definition is not a clear cut. In 
general, large simulation models such as AGLINK or FAPRI assume homogeneous goods and, 
consequently, a single world price for each commodity. Studies including the imperfect competition 
hypothesis vary in this aspect. Patterson and Abbott (1994) adopt a homogeneous good assumption 
to test for imperfect competition  in the US exports of wheat and corn; similarly Hamilton and 
Stiegert (2002) use a homogeneous good setting to test for the rent-shifting hypothesis generated by 
the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). Thursby and Thursby (1990) build a Canada-US duopoly model 
for wheat exports to Japan assuming goods are differentiated by country but homogeneous across 
firms.  This  setting  is  similar  to that  by  McCorriston  and  MacLaren  (2007a),  who  evaluate  the 
general STE trade-distorting effects, by Dong et al. (2006), who analyse the STE effect in the barley 
market, and by Goldberg and Knetter (1999), who study competition in the German export of beer 
and linerboard paper.  
In  general,  agricultural  economics  trade  studies  set  up  models  within  quantity  setting 
maximizing frameworks. The rationale for this is confirmed, for example, by the study of Dong et 
al. (2006), that find support in favour of a quantity-setting oligopoly in the barley market instead of 
a price-setting mechanism: their results show that the market behave as in Cournot competition, a 
result similar to that of  Hamilton and Stiegert (2002), although obtained  in  a different setting. 
Thursby and Thursby (1990) test for firms behaviour concluding that wheat exports to Japan are 3 
 
more competitive than Cournot but less competitive than Bertrand. Based on the results by Dong et 
al. (2006) and Hamilton and Stiegert (2002), Cournot behaviour is used as a maintained hypothesis 
in the structural framework developed by McCorriston and MacLaren (2007a). 
In the above studies the main differences stay in some structural aspects, such as the explicit 
modelling of the domestic market, the presence of STEs, and the definition of the STE’s objective 
function
2. This last aspect is a key element to correctly analyse the STE’s impact on export markets. 
Sexton and Lavoie (2001) review this literature highlighting the importance of the definition of the 
STE’s objective function and its strategic interaction with other agents. They quote different studies 
where  the  objective  has  been  alternatively  defined  as  maximization  of  total  sales,  revenues, 
producer  returns,  and  revenues  in  the  handling  market,  depending  on  the  relevant  hypothesis 
concerning government views on the role of the STE. 
McCorriston  and  MacLaren  (2007a)  stress  the  role  of  STE  playing  as  an  export  subsidy 
equivalent. They set up a model where STEs maximize a general welfare function that is the sum of 
consumer  surplus,  producer  surplus  and  profits  from  sales  to  the  domestic  and  international 
markets.  Weights  are  eventually  imposed  on  the  two  surplus  measures  in  order  to  reflect  the 
government view on which category to favour. Moreover, as in Thursby and Thursby  (1990), it is 
assumed that profits can be costlessly transferred by the government to consumers and/or producers, 
with no impact on markets (i.e. government transfers are assumed to be fully decoupled).  
Dong et al. (2006) and Hamilton and Stiegert (2002) focus on the role of the delayed producer 
payment system as a mean of exerting market power in the export market. STEs set a low initial 
price to producers that allow them to better compete in the export market, similarly to an export 
subsidy; in a later phase, STEs provide a lump-sum payment to producers considering all returns 
from sales. Strategic interaction is modelled as a two-stage game solved by backward induction. 
Hamilton and Stiegert (2002) find a significant role of the delayed payment system of the CWB in 
extracting rents from the international wheat market. On the contrary, Dong et al. (2006) reject this 
hypothesis for the malting barley market. 
 
3. Theoretical model 
 
Following Thursby and Thursby (1990) and McCorriston and MacLaren (2007a) we set up a 
partial  equilibrium  model  where  an  exported  good  is  differentiated  by  exporting  country  but 
homogeneous  across  domestic  firms.  The  domestic  market  is  segmented  from  the  international 
market, while we assume the absence of two-way trade (i.e. the exporting country does not import 
the same good). Within the exporting country there are intermediate marketing agents (exporters) 
that buy the good from competitive producers and decide how much to sell on the international 
market  and  on  the  domestic  market.  The  international  market  is  made  by  different  importing 
countries that competitively import the good and do not export it.  
More specifically, consider the exporting country u (u = 1,…, U) with M
u (i,j = 1, …, M
u) 
exporting firms and N
u-M
u (i,j = M
u+1, …N
u) firms selling only domestically (to simplify notation, 
in the following descriptions we drop the u superscript from the number of firms). Firms i sell a 
homogeneous product and face a domestic inverse demand 
  
(1)  ( , )
u u u u
d d d P P Y Z        
 
                                                 
2 An alternative option is that of considering countries as agents, a hypothesis often considered in earlier works, from 
McCalla (1966) to Kolstad and Burris (1986). As mentioned by Sexton and Lavoie (2001), considering countries as 
agents is controversial: STEs or government intervention on exports and exporters could support this assumption, but 
the same behaviour could be modelled considering strategic interaction among firms and specific objective functions, 









Y y  is  the  total  quantity  supplied  to the 
domestic market by all the N intermediate marketing agents, and 
u
d Z  is a vector of demand shifters 
in the domestic market. The M firms face an international inverse import demand:  
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X x   is the total quantity exported by the M exporters operating 
in country u, and 
u
w Z  is a vector of export demand shifters for country u. The upstream market is 
made by competitive producers showing a domestic inverse supply:   
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s P  is the producer’s price in country u, and 
u
s Z  is a vector of supply shifters for country u. 
The objective of the i
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ik x  is the quantity exported by exporter i to the importing country k (k = 1,…K), 
h g  allows 
for the possibility of government intervention in the domestic or in the international market, in the 
form of per unit subsidy to the intermediate agent, and 
h
i tr can be considered as a general marketing 
cost of the exporter, specific for each importing country. 
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where it is implicitly assumed that firms do not make conjectures about a specific firm’s reaction in 











),  while  they  consider  only  the  total  quantity 
exported by a rival country 
u X . Equations (5) and (6) can be rearranged in flexibility form: 
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 is the flexibility of import demand of country h with respect to exports of each 
of the U exporting countries, and  .,.   indicates the different types of firm’s conjectures: 
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j X x  indicates the (quantity) responses of an exporting country u to a change in exports by firm j in 
country h;    , j ik x x  indicates the response of firm j to a change in exports by firm i (both operating in 
the same exporting country h) to the importing country k ( , 1
j ik x x    when i=j);  
,
h h
j X Y x 
 indicates the 
domestic supply response to a change in exports by a domestic firm; 
,
h
j Y y  indicates the domestic 
demand response to a change in domestic sales by an exporting firm; 
, j i y y  indicates the response of 
domestic sales by the exporting firm j to a change in sales by the exporting firm i (
, 1




j X Y y 
 indicates the domestic supply response to a change in sales to the domestic market 
by an exporting firm. 
Since the objective of the paper is to carry out an analysis at the market level, equations (7) 
and (8) need to be aggregated over the M exporting firms. Assuming symmetry among exporting 
















M h N M Y Y Y
   . Since the symmetry assumption is quite unrealistic, following Thursby and 
Thursby (1990), we can interpret M as the “Herfindahl equivalent number of symmetric firms”. 
This is computed as the inverse of the Herfindahl index (H




 , equations (7) and (8) can be rewritten as: 
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  are, respectively, the shares of exporters in total supply and 
total demand of the country, and  .,.   indicates the representative firm’s conjectures: 
, , , ,
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,
u
ik X x  indicates the export response of country u to a change in exports of all exporting firms of the 
home  country  caused  by  a  change  in  exports  of  firm  i; 
,
h h
ik X Y x 
 indicates  the  domestic  supply 
response in the home country to a change in exports of all domestic exporting firms caused by a 
change in exports of firm i; 
,
h
i Y y  indicates the domestic demand response in the home country to a 
change in domestic sales of all domestic exporting firms caused by a change in domestic sales of 6 
 
firm i; and  
,
h h
i X Y y 
 indicates the domestic supply response in the home country to a change in 
domestic sales of all domestic exporting firms caused by a change in domestic sales of firm i. Under 
the  Cournot  hypothesis  conjectures 
, , , h h h
ik i X Y x Y y  
 ,  and 
,
h h
i X Y y 




ik X x   are equal to one when u h   and equal to zero in all other cases
3. 
In the transmission equations (9) and (10), the representative exporting firm maximizes its 
profit equating the perceived marginal revenue (the first term on the left hand side) to the perceived 
marginal  cost.  The  possibility  of  the  firm  to  influence  market  prices  depends  on  how  much  it 
changes the other firms quantity setting decisions, on the characteristics of domestic and import 
demand (flexibilities), on its share on total exports of the country, on the share of exporters in the 
domestic  market,  on  the  share  of  exporters  on  domestic  production,  and  on  the  ratio  between 
exports of the home country and exports of any rival country. When the representative exporter’s 
share on total exports of the country (1/M) tend to zero the transmission equation is equivalent to 
the perfect competition case, and the difference between producer and consumer price, or between 
producer and export price, is only explained by marketing costs and/or government intervention. 
The same happens when exports are very small compared to total production and consumption of 
the country.  
In case exports are managed by STEs the above maximization problem needs to be revised, 
since the objectives of STEs can be different from those of private firms. Following McCorriston 
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Following the above procedure, the first order conditions lead to the following expressions 
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Equations (1), (2), (3), (9), and (10) are the starting point to define the equilibrium conditions 
for the exporting country u that can be used for empirical purposes. To close the model we need to 
define the behaviour of the N-M firms selling only domestically. Assuming these firms behave as 
price takers, they influence the equilibrium conditions only through the share parameters 
h
s a  and 
h
d a , 
the  first one depending on the  exporter’s quantity setting decision and the  second one  being  a 
constant, since both exporters and domestic sellers face the same total domestic demand and sell a 













.                     
 
                                                 
3Alternatively to the symmetry assumption, Goldberg and Knetter (1999) prefer to interpret the result of aggregation as 
an industry average, with averages computed as share weighted means for all firms of the exporting country. Assuming 
symmetry among firms, also price transmission equations obtained from share weighting reduce to (9) and (10). 7 
 
In the complete model, the whole set of equations is repeated for the U exporting countries. 
Finally,  equations  (9)  and  (10)  are  replaced  by  (12)  and  (13)  when  a  STE  is  operating  in  the 
exporting  country,  and  the  share  parameter  1
h
d a    when  the  STE  manages  the  whole  domestic 
supply. 
The dimension and complexity of the above model depends on the number of u exporting 
countries and k importing regions that need to be modelled. Note that, as it is written, the model is 
still in general form, since it does not specify functional forms and allows for different types of 
conjectures (i.e different type of strategic behaviour by firms). 
 
4. Empirical model 
 
In this section, we present a simulation exercise based on a simple case consisting of two 
exporting  countries  and  one  importing  region.  The  empirical  specification  of  equations  (1)-(3) 
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where GDP indicates the gross domestic product of the exporting country u and of the importing 




s  ,  and . u  are  price  elasticities, , and are  parameters,  and  the  variable  Trend 
captures the effects of other exogenous time varying shifters. Equations are specified in direct form: 
this  implies that  flexibilities of transmission equations  are written as the  inverse of elasticities. 
Since we assume two exporting countries with differentiated goods, for the import demand equation 
the full elasticity matrix needs to be inverted. 
Artificial data are used for the simulation exercise. We assume for the base year that exporting 
countries are symmetric in variables and parameters, with the following values: 
-  prices equal to 100 for all price categories; 
-  domestic production equal to 100 for both countries; 
-  the domestic market is as large as the export market for each country (50, 50); 
-  exporting and non-exporting firms equally share the domestic market (25, 25); 
-  firms behave as Cournot; 
-  domestic price elasticities  are  1.5
u
d    ,  0.5
u
s   ,  1.5 uu    , and  . 0.5 u   ; 
-  parameters are  1 1 1
u u
d w     ,  0
u u
d w     ,  0.002
u
s    (technological trend); 
-  when a STE is present, it manages the whole domestic supply ( 1
h
d a  );  
-  the intercept parameters  .
u   are computed in the calibration procedure at the first year of 
the simulation period. 
 




Table  1  shows  the  results  of  the  simulation  exercise  concerning  market  prices.  Different 
hypotheses are compared based on the structure of the exporters in the two exporting counties: both 
monopolists, both perfectly competitive, one monopolist and one perfectly competitive, and the 
presence  of  a  STE  compared  to  monopolistic,  oligopolistic  and  perfectly  competitive  markets. 
Dynamics  for  the  simulation  are  introduced  assuming  a  GDP
k  increase  of  2%  per  year  and  a 
positive technological trend for the domestic supply function of 0.2%. Given the symmetric values 
of variables and parameters for the two countries, differences in the results only depend on the 
market structure hypotheses. 8 
 
Reacting to the increasing import demand, export prices increase. As expected, when both 
exporters are monopolists we have the highest increase of the export price, since both of them tend 
to react less in quantity terms. The producer price goes in the opposite direction, since a larger 
export quantity increases the exporters’ share in the input market, thus increasing their monopsony 
power. The domestic consumer price shows a smaller increase compared to the export price because 
of a lower flexibility (in absolute value) of the domestic inverse demand
4 and a lower degree of 
market power on the domestic  market, since the (monopolist) exporter holds only 50% of this 
market. 
Opposite to the previous case, the quantity reaction is larger when both exporting countries 
have competitive exporters. Considering no transportation and marketing costs, all prices are the 
same and show the smaller increase. Note that, compared to the previous case, consumer prices are 
higher. Hence, even if there is no mark-up between farm and consumer price, the higher farm level 
prices due to the perfectly competitive structure generate higher prices in the final domestic market. 
When one country is characterized by a monopolist exporter while the other have competitive 
exporters the results are not symmetric anymore. The monopolist act similarly to the first case, even 
if the price response is slightly lower. This depends on the degree of substitution of the exported 
product with the product exported by the perfectly competitive country. In this last country, as in 
the previous case, producer, consumer and export prices coincide, even if they grow slightly more 
because  of  the  substitution  effect  with  the  monopolist’s  product.  Producers  in  the  perfectly 
competitive country benefit from higher prices when the other country act as a monopolist, while 
consumers pay higher prices in the final market.  
The presence of a STE changes the results for both producers and consumers. For the first 
category no monopsony power is exercised, while for the second only one agent is now managing 
the entire domestic production. Contrary to a monopolist, when a STE faces a perfectly competitive 
exporter the following events occur: 1) the producer price increases in the simulation period (since 
the STE is biased toward producers, its share in the input market has no impact); 2) producers are 
stimulated to raise production that is sent to a larger extent on the export market, that weights 15% 
more than the national market (10% in the monopoly case); 3) larger exports generate a smaller 
increase in the export price; 4) a STE biased toward producers and acting as a full monopolist in the 
domestic market constrains domestic supply, thus raising consumer price; and, 5) in the perfectly 
competitive country prices are slightly  lower as compared to the previous case, because of the 
competition with the lower export price of the STE.  
An oligopoly or a monopoly competing with a STE increase generate stronger increases in the 
export price, domestic price and consumer price in the country having the STE. The producer price 
decreases for the oligopolistic/monopolistic country because of the stronger market power of the 
buying agent. Related to this is the level of the consumer price in this country, that increases in the 
oligopoly case as compared to perfect competition, but decreases in the monopoly case for the 
prevailing effect of the lower input price.  
Comparing the monopoly/monopoly case with the STE/monopoly one, it turns out how the 
consumers of the STE’s country are those paying higher prices while export prices are lower in both 
countries. The monopoly country shows similar results in the two cases, even if the mark-up is 
slightly lower when the competing country have a STE, since the smaller quantity exported reduces 
the exporter’s weight (market power) in the input market. 
 
5.2. Sensitivity analysis 
 
                                                 
4 Price elasticities are the same for the domestic and international market (-1.5). However, the inversion of the full 
elasticity matrix leads to a own price flexibility of -0.75 for the import demand and of -0.67 for the domestic demand. A 
lower flexibility in absolute value means that the ratio between consumer and producer price is smaller; therefore, also 
the degree of price transmission is smaller.   9 
 
In order to analyse the properties of the model, we have carried out some sensitivity analysis 
concerning some of the exogenous parameters of our equations. Comparison is made at the last year 
of the simulation (2018), where differences are of larger magnitude. 
Figure 1 shows changes in prices for different values of the Herfindahl index (H) in the two 
countries. The figure reproduces at the two extremes the first two cases illustrated in table 1. It is 
evident how prices do not linearly depend on H and, interestingly, how the function of the consumer 
price is concave with a maximum corresponding to the central values in the 0-1 Herfindahl interval: 
the higher market power on consumers is mitigated by the lower producer price.  
Figure  2  highlights  the  price  transmission  properties  between  the  producer  price  and  the 
domestic (export) prices. Values represent the following ratio: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( 1)
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, where t is a time 
period of the simulation. Price transmission  is  equal to one  in case of perfect competition and 
decreases  non  linearly  with  firms’  concentration.  For  high  levels  of  concentration  transmission 
becomes  negative:  it  means  that  prices  move  in  the  opposite  direction,  as  it  is  for  the  two-
monopolists case of table 1. 
When Country 1 is a monopolist the variation in the exporters’ structure of Country 2 has 
relatively little impact on its market prices (figure 3), while prices in Country 2 show a similar 
pattern to what described in figure 1, with values scaled upward (figure 4). The same reasoning 
applies for price transmissions illustrated in figure 5. Figures do not substantially change when a 
STE is present in Country 1, although it interesting to note how the degree of transmission in this 
country shifts upward and become positive (figure 6). Differently from the monopoly case, the 
change of the exporter’s share in the domestic market has no impact on the producer price, which 
moves in the same direction of the downstream market prices, since there is no monopsony power. 
The  market  prices  and  their  transmission  levels  described  in  the  previous  figures  clearly 
depend on the assumption about the magnitude of the different parameters and variables of the 
model: Cournot behaviour, elasticities, share of exports on domestic production, share of exporters 
on the domestic market, government intervention, and marketing costs. For example, more elastic 
import demand reduces the price response, higher cross-price elasticities increase the reciprocal 
influence between exporters, and higher shares in the domestic market increase the influence of 
exporters on domestic prices.  
Since the final objective of the model is policy simulation, as last example it is interesting to 
evaluate how market power can influence the impact of policy measures, such as export subsidies. 
Considering different levels of concentration in Country 1 and oligopolistic exporters in Country 2 
(H=0.2), figure 7 shows the effect of the introduction of a per-unit export subsidy equal to 5. In the 
perfect competition case the difference between export prices and domestic prices is given by the 
level of the subsidy, with the export price being lower. As concentration increases, following the 
pattern  described  in  the  previous  figures,  the  producer  price  decreases  and  the  consumer  price 
follows a concave pattern. With higher firm concentration, export prices can result to be higher than 
producer  prices  at the  end  of  the  simulation  period,  since  exporters take  full  advantage  of  the 
increasing import demand without transmitting the price increase in the domestic market. Thus, the 
subsidy becomes a pure form of coupled transfer to producers, highlighting how final results of 





In  this  paper,  we  have  developed  a  model  that  explains  the  exporters’  behaviour  in 
international  commodity  markets  considering  explicitly  the  case  of  an  imperfectly  competitive 
structure of these markets. The main reason that motivates our research is that virtually all models 
currently  used  to  simulate  agricultural  and  food  policy  scenarios  assume  perfectly  competitive 10 
 
markets,  both  domestically  and  internationally,  despite  a  number  of  evidences  that  make  this 
assumption unrealistic. Thus, drawing from the imperfect competition and trade literature, in our 
model we have derived price transmission equations between producer and consumer prices and 
between producer and export prices that can be included in large commodity models in order to 
verify how results of these models change assuming the imperfect competition hypothesis.  
Our  model  considers  both the  case  in  which  imperfect  competition  may  come  from  high 
concentration of firms operating in the export market (i.e. large national or multinational trading 
companies) or from the presence of State Trading Enterprises (STEs), as those operating in the 
cereal  market  in  countries  like  Canada  and  Australia.  The  model  has  the  advantage  of  being 
sufficiently  general  to  include  different  numbers  of  importing  and  exporting  countries,  also 
distinguishing for the number of exporting firms and their share in the export and domestic markets. 
Firm’s  conduct  is  not  constrained  to  a  particular  behaviour, although  the  model  is  based  on  a 
classical quantity setting framework. 
  In order to analyse the properties of the model, we have carried out a simple simulation 
exercise with two competing exporting countries and one importing region. The results presented in 
the previous sections show the relevance of assuming imperfect competition in commodity markets. 
For example, comparing the two extreme cases (i.e. two monopolists vs. two perfectly competitive 
exporting countries) we have rather strong differences in prices: under imperfect competition, the 
(farm level) producer price turns out to be 3.7% lower and the export price 4% higher, while, quite 
surprisingly, the consumer price is lower (-1%).  
  In  fact, one  of  the  most  interesting  results  of  the  model  is  the  “concave”  behaviour  of 
consumer prices with respect to increasing  level of concentration  in the export market. Market 
power  exerted  by  exporters  increases  domestic  consumer  prices  up  to  an  intermediate  level  of 
concentration, while moving toward the monopoly case the impact is mitigated by the lower price 
of the agricultural input. Under our assumptions concerning the parameters of the model (i.e. import 
demand  elasticities,  domestic  demand  and  supply  elasticities),  consumer  turn  out to  pay  lower 
prices under the monopolist case than under the perfect competition case.    
  Other important results come  from the asymmetric cases considered  in our analysis:  for 
example, producers in a perfectly competitive country benefit of higher prices when the competitive 
exporter is a monopolist (or a STE), while consumers pay higher prices in the final market. As 
expected, the role of STEs is rather different from that of a private monopolist: producers in the 
STE’s country always benefit of higher prices, although lower than in the perfect competition case, 
while consumer in the same countries always pay higher prices. Consumers pay higher prices also 
in countries competing with a STE, as long as their exporting structure is perfectly competitive or 
oligopolistic. 
  The  above  results  clearly  depends  on  some  key  assumptions  of  the  model,  such  as  the 
symmetry of firms (the standard condition for aggregation), that determines a direct link between 
market  power  and  market  structure,  as  well  as  the  type  of  STE’s  objective  function.  Further 
investigation in this area could provide more insight on the relevance of these assumptions for 
policy  modelling  purposes.  Finally,  in  terms  of  using  our  transmission  equations  in  large 
commodity models routinely used for policy analysis, the key problem to be solved is adapting such 
models to the so called “Armington assumption” considered in our model and in large part of the 
literature  addressing  the  issue  of  imperfect  competition  (i.e.  products  are  differentiated  among 
exporting countries and their export prices may be different), since the price transmission equations 
used  in  these  models  typically  assume  only  one  export/world  price  for  each  commodity.11 
 
Table  1  –  Dynamic  of  prices  over  the  simulation  period  under  different  market  structure  hypotheses  for  the  two 
exporting countries 
Country 1 vs Country 2  Variables  Years 
      2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018 
Both monopolists                   
  PW1  100.00  101.02  102.09  103.17  104.27  105.38  106.51  107.65 
  PP1  100.00  99.95  99.90  99.86  99.82  99.77  99.73  99.70 
  PC1  100.00  100.38  100.78  101.19  101.60  102.02  102.44  102.87 
  X1  50.00  50.49  50.96  51.43  51.91  52.39  52.87  53.35 
  Y1  25.00  24.86  24.71  24.56  24.41  24.26  24.11  23.96 
Both perfect competition                 
  PW1  100.00  100.64  101.03  101.54  102.02  102.52  103.02  103.54 
  PP1  100.00  100.64  101.03  101.54  102.02  102.52  103.02  103.54 
  PC1  100.00  100.64  101.03  101.54  102.02  102.52  103.02  103.54 
  X1  50.00  50.68  51.48  52.25  53.04  53.84  54.64  55.45 
  Y1  25.00  24.76  24.61  24.43  24.26  24.08  23.90  23.72 
Monopolist vs perfect competition                 
  PW1  100.00  100.94  101.86  102.81  103.77  104.74  105.73  106.73 
  PP1  100.00  99.95  99.90  99.86  99.82  99.78  99.74  99.70 
  PC1  100.00  100.35  100.70  101.05  101.41  101.78  102.15  102.53 
  X1  50.00  50.46  50.89  51.33  51.77  52.22  52.66  53.11 
  Y1  25.00  24.87  24.74  24.61  24.48  24.35  24.22  24.08 
  PW2  100.00  100.69  101.16  101.72  102.26  102.82  103.40  103.98 
  PP2  100.00  100.69  101.16  101.72  102.26  102.82  103.40  103.98 
  PC2  100.00  100.69  101.16  101.72  102.26  102.82  103.40  103.98 
  X2  50.00  50.71  51.60  52.44  53.31  54.19  55.07  55.96 
  Y2  25.00  24.74  24.57  24.37  24.18  23.98  23.78  23.58 
STE vs perfect competition                 
  PW1  100.00  100.73  101.36  102.03  102.71  103.39  104.09  104.81 
  PP1  100.00  100.18  100.34  100.51  100.68  100.85  101.02  101.20 
  PC1  100.00  100.55  101.02  101.52  102.03  102.55  103.07  103.60 
  X1  50.00  50.61  51.25  51.90  52.54  53.20  53.85  54.51 
  Y1  50.00  49.59  49.24  48.88  48.52  48.15  47.78  47.41 
  PW2  100.00  100.66  101.09  101.61  102.11  102.64  103.17  103.72 
  PP2  100.00  100.66  101.09  101.61  102.11  102.64  103.17  103.72 
  PC2  100.00  100.66  101.09  101.61  102.11  102.64  103.17  103.72 
  X2  50.00  50.69  51.53  52.33  53.16  53.98  54.82  55.67 
  Y2  25.00  24.76  24.60  24.41  24.23  24.04  23.86  23.67 
STE vs oligopoly (H=0.2)                 
  PW1  100.00  100.74  101.39  102.08  102.77  103.47  104.19  104.92 
  PP1  100.00  100.18  100.35  100.52  100.69  100.87  101.05  101.23 
  PC1  100.00  100.55  101.05  101.56  102.08  102.61  103.14  103.69 
  X1  50.00  50.61  51.27  51.92  52.58  53.25  53.91  54.59 
  Y1  50.00  49.59  49.23  48.85  48.48  48.11  47.73  47.35 
  PW2  100.00  100.69  101.24  101.85  102.45  103.07  103.70  104.35 
  PP2  100.00  100.36  100.64  100.95  101.25  101.57  101.89  102.23 
  PC2  100.00  100.63  101.13  101.68  102.23  102.80  103.37  103.96 
  X2  50.00  50.67  51.42  52.16  52.91  53.66  54.43  55.19 
  Y2  25.00  24.77  24.58  24.38  24.19  23.99  23.79  23.59 
cont.12 
 
Table 1 – cont. 
STE vs monopolist                   
  PW1  100.00  100.79  101.52  102.28  103.05  103.83  104.62  105.43 
  PP1  100.00  100.20  100.38  100.57  100.76  100.96  101.16  101.36 
  PC1  100.00  100.59  101.14  101.71  102.28  102.87  103.47  104.08 
  X1  50.00  50.64  51.35  52.05  52.76  53.47  54.18  54.90 
  Y1  50.00  49.56  49.15  48.75  48.33  47.92  47.51  47.09 
  PW2  100.00  100.96  101.95  102.95  103.96  104.99  106.04  107.10 
  PP2  100.00  99.95  99.90  99.86  99.82  99.78  99.74  99.70 
  PC2  100.00  100.36  100.73  101.11  101.49  101.87  102.26  102.66 
  X2  50.00  50.47  50.92  51.37  51.83  52.29  52.75  53.21 






















Figure 2 - Price transmission between producer and export and consumer prices for different symmetric levels of 
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Figure 3 - Prices in Country 1 at the end of the simulation period (2018) for different levels of concentration in Country 
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Figure 5 - Price transmission between producer and export and consumer prices for different levels of concentration in 
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Figure 6 - Price transmission between producer and export and consumer prices for different levels of concentration in 
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Figure 7 - Prices at the end of the simulation period (2018) for different levels of concentration and an export subsidy of 
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